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European Central Bank working paper series 39Abstract 
 
We show how in a Blanchard-Yaari, overlapping generations framework, perfect 
substitutability of government bonds in Monetary Union tempts governments to exploit the 
enlarged common pool of savings. In Nash equilibrium all governments increase their bond 
financed transfers to current generations (prosperity effect) at the expense of future 
generations (posterity effect). The resulting deficit bias occurs even if one assumes that before 
Monetary Union countries had eliminated their deficit bias by designing appropriate domestic 
institutions. The paper provides a rationale for an increased focus on fiscal discipline in 
Monetary Union, without the need to assume imperfect credibility of existing Treaty 
provisions or to refer to extreme situations involving sovereign default. We draw on existing 
empirical evidence to argue that the degree of government bond substitutability within the 
European Monetary Union is an order of magnitude larger than in the global economy.    
 
Keywords: fiscal spillover effects, common pool, overlapping generations, bond market 
integration, fiscal discipline, fiscal rules, European Monetary Union 
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December 2004Non-technical summary 
 
Budget deficits redistribute wealth and welfare from future to current generations. In this 
paper we discuss how financial integration associated with Monetary Union alters 
governments’ incentives for the intertemporal distribution of government financing and thus 
intergenerational equity.  
 
We start from a standard overlapping generations model and add the assumption that 
democratically elected governments face the temptation of benefiting generations currently 
alive (prosperity) at the expense of future generations (posterity). In a closed economy 
(“autarky”) a profligate fiscal policy will push up interest rates, thus imposing long-term costs 
on  future generations. In an intertemporal set-up a trade-off arises between the ability of 
governments to affect aggregate expenditure in the short run and adverse crowding-out effects 
with negative growth consequences via higher interest rates in the longer run. We formally 
capture this trade-off by specifying a government preference function including current 
transfers (prosperity) and the (negative) equilibrium interest rate (posterity).  
 
The elimination of exchange rate risk implied by Monetary Union renders government bond 
markets close to perfect substitutes. The high degree of euro area bond yield convergence and 
the almost perfect correlation of euro area government bond yields since the start of European 
Monetary Union in 1999 indicate a lack of any sizeable market discrimination with regard to 
sovereign risk characteristics of government bonds. We also argue that empirically the degree 
of bond market integration within the euro area is an order of magnitude larger than that of 
global financial markets. The empirical evidence presented suggests that the introduction of 
the euro has had a significant impact on financing conditions for euro area governments. 
 
Government bond market integration has the effect that the common interest rate in the 
monetary Union rises less in response to a single government’s expansionary fiscal policy 
than this country’s domestic interest rate would have responded in the case of autarky. The 
reason is that a government can now draw on the common pool of total Monetary Union 
savings. With reduced marginal long-run costs of profligate fiscal policy, each government 
has an additional incentive to expand its domestic fiscal policy in Monetary Union. Of course, 
each single government realizes that this incentive prevails for all governments and that the 
common interest rate will be determined by the combined fiscal policies of all countries 
participating in the Monetary Union. The Nash solution is the equilibrium in which each 
government’s expectations about the other governments’ fiscal policies are validated and in 
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December 2004The Nash equilibrium of this game between fiscal authorities shows that Monetary Union 
exacerbates the challenge of maintaining fiscal policies, which preserve intergenerational 
equity. Without additional mechanisms to foster fiscal discipline, interest rates will be higher, 
debt and deficits larger and future generations will lose relative to generations born earlier.  
 
Our approach has two advantages compared to existing models explaining the need for fiscal 
discipline in the European Monetary Union. First, the case for fiscal discipline in our model 
does not rely on imperfect credibility of Treaty provisions in the fields of monetary policy and 
the fiscal policy framework. Second, our case for fiscal discipline does not have to assume 
unsustainable developments in public finances, which are hard to reconcile with models 
assuming forward-looking agents and rational expectations. Instead in our model, the relevant 
spillover effects in perfectly integrated bond markets operate at all times and provide an 
additional strong underpinning for the need for fiscal discipline in Monetary Union based on 
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December 2004“As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving 
it is to use it as sparingly as possible by cultivating peace (… and) avoiding likewise the accumulation 
of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to 
discharge the debt that wars have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen 
that we ourselves ought to bear.” 
 





Since the 1970s, most industrialized countries have recorded persistent budget deficits, 
leading to the accumulation of public debt to levels unusual for peacetime. In the coming 
years the challenges for public finances are exacerbated by the impact of demographics and in 
this context the question of intergenerational equity has come to the fore. In most Member 
States of the European Union sustainability of pensions and health systems is among the most 
pressing challenges calling for structural reforms. 
 
The benefits associated with sound public finances are generally recognized.  Over the 
medium to long term budget deficits have a negative impact on growth or the level of 
potential output.  From a neo-classical viewpoint, persistent budget deficits and the 
accumulation of public debt lead to an increase in equilibrium real interest rates, crowding out 
of private investment and, therefore, to a lower capital stock over time. Available empirical 
evidence seems to confirm these effects.  For example, Easterly et al. (1994), using a cross-
section sample of more than 50 countries covering the period from 1965-90, found a positive, 
and statistically significant relation between growth in GDP per capita, and budget surpluses 
(in per cent of GDP). Ardagna et al. (2004) provide evidence on significant interest rate 
effects of national public debt and deficits for 16 OECD counties even after controlling for 
the worldwide fiscal stance. 
 
Budget deficits also redistribute wealth and welfare from future to current generations.
1 In this 
paper we are concerned with intertemporal effects from government financing and how 
financial integration associated with Monetary Union alters governments’ incentives for 
deficit spending. We use an overlapping generation model to consider issues of 
intergenerational burden sharing.  The basic idea is to argue that budgetary authorities face 
the temptation of benefiting generations currently alive (current prosperity) at the expense of 
future generations (posterity).  In a closed economy (“autarky”) when the government follows 
a profligate policy this pushes up interest rates. The long run costs of the policy pursued are 
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December 2004apparent in the increased level of real interest rates. In an intertemporal set up a trade-off 
arises between the ability of governments to affect aggregate expenditure in the short run 
(say, for stabilization purposes) and the crowding out through higher interest rates with 
adverse effects on growth in the longer run. 
 
At the national level, rules aiming at fiscal discipline may be justified on the basis of a 
politically motivated deficit bias (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for a review of the relevant 
arguments). In this paper, we need not rely on the assumption of a domestic deficit bias in 
order to establish a case for fiscal discipline in a Monetary Union. In an open economy 
spillovers across countries arise. In particular, monetary unification exacerbates the challenge 
of maintaining budgetary discipline to the extent that it is associated with a closer integration 
of bond markets. Then the cost of current deficit financing for individual governments, in 
terms of higher interest rates, is spread out over the whole union.  
 
An earlier, closely related paper is Beetsma and Vermeylen (2003), who emphasize the 
supply side of public debt in a Monetary Union. An increased degree of debt substitutability 
in Monetary Union leads to a lower demand for government bonds. This implies a higher 
equilibrium interest rate. The effect on overall public debt issuance is ambiguous and works 
via the central bank reaction function. The authors show that the relative share of Monetary 
Union countries’ debt issued by governments with previously more dependent central banks 
and more myopic governments increases in Monetary Union. Our contribution follows 
Beetsma and Vermeylen in focusing on implications from increased bond market integration. 
However, we do not take account of portfolio diversification effects in order to single out the 
effects of increased substitutability of sovereign bonds on governments’ incentives to issue. 
 
The conceptual framework in our paper and the relevant economic mechanism follows 
closely the contribution by Chang (1990) but uses it in the context of Monetary Union. The 
results follow from three features of the model. First, the model allows for departures from 
Ricardian equivalence. Therefore government finance has real effects. In Chang’s model, the 
departure from Ricardian equivalence is implied by a discrete-time overlapping generations 
set-up, originally due to Samuelson (1958). Second, there is full capital mobility across 
countries. In other words government debt markets are assumed to be perfectly integrated. 
Third, national governments care about the welfare of their own national constituencies and 
disregard the welfare of foreigners. Chang argues that the first two conditions imply that there 
are negative spillovers associated with domestic expansion through higher interest rates. The 
third condition means that, in the absence of appropriate supra-national institutions, fiscal 
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Our contribution differs from Chang’s in two important aspects. First, instead of a discrete 
time set-up we use the continuous-time overlapping generation model of Blanchard and 
Yaari. This allows for a simpler presentation of the game among fiscal authorities. In our set-
up the game is a simple static one-shot game. Second, Chang focuses on the world economy. 
He states:  “In a world with international capital mobility, the fiscal deficit of any single 
government affects the world interest rates and therefore affects intertemporal resource 
allocation in all countries.” We argue instead that the argument is much more relevant for 
monetary unions among sovereign nations (like the euro area). The argument is empirical. 
Specifically, we show that monetary unification is empirically associated with sovereign debt 
market integration inside the union, which is an order of magnitude deeper than in the global 
economy.  This suggests that the case for fiscal discipline inside Monetary Union is much 
stronger than the case for a global concern over fiscal discipline. 
 
In general, the need for supra-national fiscal discipline in Monetary Union is justified by the 
existence of relevant spillovers across countries. Broadly speaking there are three main types 
of spillover mechanisms mentioned in the literature. One source of spillovers results from the 
interaction of multiple fiscal authorities with the single monetary policy. An increased 
propensity to build public debt is seen to make the task of monetary policy to maintain price 
stability more difficult. The second mechanism relies on unsustainable public finances with 
the prospect of insolvency prompting a bail-out by other governments (either on political 
grounds or on fears of the systemic fall-out from a sovereign borrower default). Finally, the 
third type of argument, which is also the approach taken in our model, involves fiscal-fiscal 
spillovers in Monetary Union, which lead to higher real interest rates and a worsening of any 
pre-existing domestic “deficit bias”.
2
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some recent evidence 
on the integration of bond markets in the euro area. Drawing on evidence from Baele et al. 
(2004) and Cappiello et al (2003) we argue that the elimination of exchange rate risk in 
Monetary Union, together with progress towards the single European market, increasingly 
allows governments to consider euro area savings as a common pool when issuing public 
debt. Using non-euro area countries as controls we are able to show that the degree of 
integration reached inside the euro area is much deeper than at the global level. 
 
                                                           
2 See, for example, Beetsma (2001) or Ongena and Winkler (2001) for a review. Uhlig (2003) presents 
a model based on the third mechanism. In the discussion Gaspar (2003) outlines the approach followed 
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December 2004In Section 3 we introduce a standard work-horse in macroeconomics – the Blanchard-Yaari 
continuous time overlapping generations model with government bonds as the single state 
variable. This allows to capture the trade-off a fiscal policy maker faces between current and 
future generations’ welfare. The trade-off occurs because the government has the power to 
grant transfers to current generations to the detriment of future generations, who will have to 
share the burden of higher taxes.  We sketch how the government balances the prosperity of 
current with the welfare of posterior generations. Thus the model can be used to illustrate the 
possibility of a political-economy domestic deficit bias in an intergenerational framework, 
which would then be exacerbated by spillovers arising in a Monetary Union. 
 
In Section 4 we argue that due to the integration of bond markets in a Monetary Union, 
governments are likely to face a “common pool problem”. Specifically, in Monetary Union 
there is an important fiscal-fiscal spillover associated with the integration of bond markets. 
When a government engages in expansionary transfers, benefiting current generations, it 
affects the interest rate less than it would have in a closed economy. This weaker effect 
lowers the (domestic) costs of fiscal profligacy. The (static) Nash solution shows that the 
introduction of a Monetary Union creates a deficit bias even if it did not exist in the closed 
economy (and worsens an existing deficit bias). 
 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The integration of euro area bond markets 
 
In this section we present some evidence on the degree of integration of bond markets in the 
euro area.  The evidence presented supports our claim that after the event of European 
Monetary Union (EMU) euro area savings can be considered as a common pool by euro area 
governments, when issuing their debt securities. The degree of integration of euro area bond 
markets, although not perfect, is of a scale not comparable to international integration of bond 
markets elsewhere. Thus we argue that over and above the more generalised trend towards 
globalised financial markets, the introduction of the euro has had a significant impact on 
financing conditions for euro area governments. Euro area bond market integration in our 
view has reached a level, at which the common pool spillover exposed in Section 4 is of 
significant concern.  
 
It is possible to imagine multiple reasons justifying a link between monetary unification and 
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December 2004presented in sections 3 and 4. For the argument put forward in this paper, the precise 
determinants of bond market integration, leading to high substitutability among sovereign 
bonds, are not important. What is important is that government bonds are regarded as perfect 
(sufficiently close) substitutes in portfolios. An obvious link between monetary unification 
and bond market integration is provided by the impact of exchange rate risk, and other 
departures from uncovered interest rate parity. Gordon and Gaspar (2001) present an example 
where bonds provide a hedge against domestic inflation risk before monetary unification, 
inducing a “home bias” in bond portfolios. In their setting the bias is eliminated after 
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Source: Baele et al. (2004, p. 50, Chart 5.1) 
 
 
Figure 1 taken from Baele et al. (2004) depicts the decline in nominal yield spreads of euro 
area countries with respect to German government bonds. The striking decline of spreads 
towards the vicinity of zero by May 1998
4 for all countries except Greece (which adopted the 
euro in January 2001) suggests that interest rate differentials related to expected exchange rate 
depreciation with respect to the DM (possibly together with an exchange rate risk premium) 
seem to have dominated spreads of euro area countries. The exchange rate risk seems not to 
have been transformed into idiosyncratic default risk in EMU. This suggests that market 
                                                           
3 Monetary Union has also been associated with a number of important regulatory changes. For 
example the elimination of exchange rate risk made bonds issues by sovereign borrowers, in the euro 
area, equivalent from the viewpoint of investment ratios of pension funds and other financial 
institutions. 
4 Note that on 3 May 1998, the procedure for determining the irrevocable conversion rates for the euro 
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December 2004discipline could not be much relied upon to guarantee fiscal discipline in a Monetary Union as 
recognised in the debates about how best to ensure budgetary discipline in EMU
5. 
 
Another interesting piece of evidence from Baele et al. (2004) which supports our common 
pool assumption regards the asset share of bond market funds investing Europe-wide, which 
has increased dramatically since 1999.  
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Investing Bond Market Funds
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Investing Bond Market Funds
 
 




As depicted in Figure 2, the asset share of European-wide investing funds increased from 
about 20% in 1998 to above 60% in 2002 mainly at the expense of nationally oriented bond 
market funds.  At the same time the share of globally investing bond market funds also 
declined from about 30% to just below 20%. The latter development supports our claim that 
                                                           
5 For example the Delors Report (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989) 
stated (page 24): “(…) experience suggests that market perceptions do not necessarily provide strong 
and compelling signals and that access to a large capital market may, for some time, facilitate the 
financing of economic imbalances. Rather than leading to a gradual adaptation of borrowing costs, 
market views about the creditworthiness of official borrowers tend to change abruptly and result in the 
closure of access to market financing. The constraints imposed by market forces might either be too 
slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive. Hence countries would have to accept that sharing a 
common market and a single currency area imposed policy constraints.” In a companion piece 
Lamfalussy (1989) reiterates that there is reason to be sceptical about the adequacy of sanctions 
imposed by the market mechanism.” For empirical evidence and further discussion see Restoy (1996) 
and Bernoth et al. (2004), who examine the evolution of sovereign risk premia between 1991 and 2002. 
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general globalisation of financial markets.   
 
Nevertheless, the question whether the integration process in European bond markets has a 
parallel in the globalisation of bond markets at the world level deserves further investigation. 
Further evidence presented in Figures 3, 4 and 5 supports our view that integration inside the 
euro area is much stronger and deeper than that prevailing at the global level and is closely 
associated with the process of monetary unification. 
 



















































Source: Datastream, daily observations. 
 
Figure 3 plots the 10-year bond yields for twenty-two OECD countries (eleven from the euro 
area – Luxembourg is not included – and eleven non-euro area countries). The data differs 
from Figure 1 because in that figure differentials to German bonds are shown, while Figure 3 
is presented in levels. It is obvious from Figure 3 that euro area countries cluster closely 
together. The point is made more precise in Figure 4 which plots the standard deviation of 10 
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SD OECD-Euro area
Source: Datastream, daily observations. 
 
It is clear that yield dispersion diminished rapidly in the run-up to monetary union and now 
stands at very low levels. The decline became pronounced from 1995 and since 1999 seems to 
have stabilised at very low levels. The same did not happen in non-euro area OECD countries, 
where the dispersion of bond yields remained rather flat in the last decade. 
 
Some recent papers are relevant for a deeper look at the issue of euro area versus global bond 
market integration
6. For the rest of the section we follow Capiello, Engle and Shephard 
(2003). In this paper the authors look at changes over time in correlation patterns across 
international asset markets. They find significant changes associated with the introduction of 
the euro. Specifically they find strong evidence of structural breaks in conditional 
correlations. For bond markets inside the euro area they find that bond returns became 
virtually perfectly correlated already 15 weeks before the start of EMU.  Ever since the 
correlation has always remained above 0.96 (see Figure 5). The same did not happen for the 
European countries not participating in the Monetary Union. Correlation stayed basically 
unchanged. The same holds true for North America, i.e. the correlation between Canada and 
the US (see Figure 5). 
                                                           
6 Including Kearney and Poti (2004), Skintzi and Refenes (2004), Berben and Jansen (2004) 
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Figure 5: Average bond correlation for the three groups of countries 
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Europe and North America
7. They find that correlations between the euro area and the rest of 
the world also have increased since the start of Monetary Union (see Figure 6.) However the 
magnitude of the correlation is quite different.  Even inside Europe between the euro area and 
other European countries the correlation is about 0.7. Between each of the two groups of 
European countries, on the one hand, and North America on the other, the correlation is much 
lower, in the range of 0.3 to 0.4.  
 
We conclude that the evidence shows that a) bond market integration has increased markedly 
in the euro area. In particular, there is a strong link between sovereign debt market integration 
and monetary unification in 1999. By contrast, b) comparable trends at global level (if they 
exist) are much less pronounced. In any case the degree of integration achieved inside the 




We believe that the empirical evidence above is sufficiently strong to motivate applying the 
theoretical model presented in the following sections to the case of European Monetary 
Union. In this vein, Beetsma (2001) in the first instance links the spillover effect from fiscal 
policy, through the accumulation of public debt, to an increase in world real interest rates. 
Therefore he argues that, from a conceptual viewpoint, the interest rate effect is not linked to 
monetary union per se. Nevertheless, he recognises that in a world where sovereign bonds are 
not perfect substitutes it is likely that monetary unification would increase the substitutability 
of bonds issued by participating countries. The empirical evidence we present provides a 
sufficiently strong link between monetary union and bond market integration to justify   
treating the savings in  Monetary Union as a common pool as we assume in section 4 of this 
paper. 
                                                           
7 The countries include in the sample used are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, for the euro area; Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, for the rest of 
Europe; Canada and the US for North America. 
8 An entirely different hypothesis would be that instead of monetary unification it is rather the 
existence of the Stability and Growth Pact, which by making sovereign default very unlikely, might be  
responsible for the very high correlation of euro area government bond returns. We do not regard this 
argument as convincing. First, the SGP binds also EU Member States outside the euro area, where we 
do not see this increase in return correlation. Second, past difficult episodes with regard to the 
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Figure 6: Bond return correlation between the EMU, the rest of Europe, and North America 
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3. The Blanchard-Yaari model: the trade-off 
 
We use the standard Blanchard-Yaari continuous overlapping generations model with 
infinitely lived agents (Weil, 1987) with government debt and without capital and money. 
Each moment in time the growth rate of the population is n. Newborns are disconnected from 
current members of the population by the fact that they are born with no financial wealth and 
initially start consuming only due to their positive endowment.  
Each individual of generation [x] will face the following maximisation problem. 
[x] c         y   + [x]  b r   = [x]  b      s.t.
  ds   e   [x] c           
s s s s s
t) - (s   -
s
t = s


















The index indicates time and the square brackets give the birth date of an individual to 
identify his/her generation. Real consumption is denoted c and real government bonds are b.  
θ  is the rate of time preference, while r stands for the real interest rate. Real non-interest 
income, a constant endowment, is denoted y and real lump sum taxes by τ. New generations 
are born with zero non-human wealth, which is reflected by the fact that financial wealth is 
accumulating at rate r  and not r-n in the differential equation for the state variable b in 
equation (2). 
The individual consumption function, derived from the first order conditions, is depicted in 
equation (3)
9. Agents consume with propensity θ out of their total wealth, consisting of 
financial and human wealth, h.   
 
(3)  ] h   + [x]  [b   = [x]  c t t t θ  
 
where human wealth is defined as the present value of endowment receipts net of taxes. 
 
 
















⎛ ∫ − =
= ) ( τ
 
 
                                                           
9 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1 will not restrict the generality of the results, as the 
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not need a [x] in equation (3). Equation (5) immediately follows from the first order conditions 
and describes the behavior of individual consumption over time. A positive difference between 
the real interest rate and the rate of time preference encourages people to buy government bonds 
at early stages of their lives to afford a rising consumption stream over time. 
(5)        x c   )   -   r (   =   x c t t t ] [ ] [ θ &  
Equation (6) shows the procedure to derive aggregate per capita values. This procedure is 
necessary because different generations will have accumulated different amounts of financial 
wealth and thus will have different levels of consumption. Population is growing at rate n.
10 
The total population size in period t is e
nt thus the populations size in period 0 was 1. The size 
of a generation born in period x is n e
nx. Each variable is first summed up over all generations 
as x is running from period 0 until today and the sum is then divided by the current population 




dx   [x]ne q










Equation (7) describes the dynamics of aggregate per capita consumption on the optimal path. 
Note that the second term on the right hand side of equation (7) is the difference to the 
dynamics of individual consumption in equation (5). It is explained by the fact that newborns 
(n) consume θ B less than the other generations alive, as they do not yet own any government 
bonds. 
 
(7)  t t t t B n   -   C   )   -   r (   =   C θ θ &  
 
As Y is constant and government (non-interest) expenditures are zero, C must be permanently 
constant also on the transition path to a new steady state. Thus equation (7) will determine the 
interest rate for a given size of the economy and stock of government debt.  
                                                           
10 Note that the results would also go through for a constant or even shrinking population, if a non-zero 
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government can decide on a permanent, lump sum transfer payment of the size z (z ≥ 0). In 
order to prevent real per capita debt from violating the transversality condition, taxes will be 
increased at rate β with the growing stock of government debt. This rules out debt 
sustainability issues in our model.
11  
 
(8)     z B T t t − = β  
 
Note that taxes are lump sum thus do not depend on individual holdings of government 
bonds, but only on the aggregate per capita level of government bonds. After inserting the tax 
function into the equation describing government debt dynamics, the model can then be fully 
described by equations (9)-(11). 
 





θ + =  
 
(10)      () z B n r B t t t + − − = β &
 
(11)       C Y =
 
Assuming  1 < < − β n rt  in steady state is a necessary and sufficient condition to have a 
positive steady state debt level when z>0. Equation (9) reveals that assuming θ>n will make 
sure that we are only dealing with dynamically efficient equilibrium. 
 
Figure 7 shows the phase diagram for the model (9)-(11) in r/B space. The upward sloping 
straight line is equation (9) while the B demarcation line derived from (10) is given in (12). 




n r B − + = = β : 0 &  
There could exist two equilibria. The first one (e.g. point D) is stable, while the second one 
(e.g. point B) is unstable. We do restrict our attention to the first equilibrium, where equation 
(9) also represents the adjustment path. There exists a maximum value for the transfer z, 
which is associated with equilibrium point C, in which the interest rate would reach its 
maximum level of  2 / ) ( θ β + + n . A fiscal policy with no transfers, i.e. z=0 , would lead to 
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December 2004equilibrium in point A, with no debt and the interest rate equal to the rate of time preference. 
Point D depicts some equilibrium for 0<z<z
max.   
 
 





































For the sake of simplicity we assume that the parameter of the tax reaction function, β, is 
given
12, so that z is really the only control variable for the government.  
 
The government then faces a trade-off between prosperity and posterity in the following 
sense. A positive and permanent transfer, z, which is financed by accumulating debt, 
redistributes wealth from future to current generations. In steady state the net (of tax) wealth 
of the aggregate per capita stock of government debt is B-T/r. The latter is positive as long as 
new generations enter the economy. More precisely the contribution to steady state net wealth 
stemming from government debt to generations currently alive is nB/r  or with our fiscal 
                                                           
12 The purpose is to keep the government decision problem one-dimensional. As we already excluded 
on purpose the issue of public solvency, not allowing the government to manipulate the timing of debt 
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December 2004policy regime zn/[r(β+n-r)]. Government bonds are net wealth to those who hold them, as 
future generations will have to share the tax burden to finance the debt
13.  
 
To see exactly how the redistribution of wealth from future to current generations works 
when z is increased, consider an initial situation at point A in Figure 7 where no transfers take 
place and  r is equal to the rate of time preference θ . Define time  t=v the moment in time 
where the government introduces a fiscal regime according to the tax rule (8) and decides on 
a positive transfer 0<z<z
max . All generations currently alive - including the generation born in 
t=v - are exactly equal in terms of their consumption and saving profile. As equation (3) also 
holds in aggregate per capita variables and the simultaneous issuance of government bonds 
does not yet give rise to a positive wealth effect, aggregate per capita consumption is purely 
determined by human wealth, i.e. Cv =  θ Hv. As aggregate per capita consumption C must 
always equal Y it follows that Hv remains also constant. Thus for all generations alive at the 
time of the change in policy  t=v  the positive transfer policy has no effect on their human 
wealth. The reason is that the infinite stream of current and future transfer payments is exactly 
compensated by higher future tax payments and higher future interest rates. Generations alive 
at time v use all their transfer receipts in period v to buy the government bonds issued to 
finance the transfer. The incentive to save the transfer is due to the fact that r instantaneously 
exceeds θ. From time v onwards consumption of all generations alive rises at the rate r-θ, 
according to equation (5). Given that C is a constant and newborns in t>v do initially not own 
any government bonds as opposed to previous generations, implies that newborn generations 
at time t>v have an initial consumption level at birth, which is less than Y. Furthermore, the 
initial consumption level at birth of generations born after time v is declining, as depicted in 
Figure 8. Figure 8 shows the consumption level paths of generations born at arbitrary points 
in time, i.e. v (and before), v+1, v+2 and v+j. 
  
As shown above, human capital remained constant in time v. Thereafter human capital will 
shrink as taxes and interest rates are continuously increasing with the level of aggregate per 
capita bonds on the path to the new steady state (see adjustment path in Figure 7). To 
compare the extremes, note that human capital for a generation born at time v (or before) as of 
time v (or before) is Y/θ . Human capital for a generation born in the new steady state with a 









 , where r is then the higher new 
                                                           
13 See Blanchard (1985), Buiter (1988) and Weil (1989). See Detken (1999) for intergenerational 
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efficient economy where r>n. 
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= = , thus equal to its consumption at birth 
divided by θ. It follows that the present value of consumption of generations born up to (and 
including) the period of the introduction of the transfer system t = v, remains unchanged at 
Y/θ, despite the introduction of positive transfers. But lifetime utility of these generations 
after introducing the transfer system is clearly higher than before, due to the effect that 
consumption is now on an ever increasing path.      
                                                           
14 Note that the population share weighted sum of all generations’ consumption at any point in time in 
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cost of lower consumption and lower utility of future generations. The annex proves that the 
lower initial consumption level at birth of generations born in the new steady state - in Figure 
8 possibly depicted by the consumption path starting in period v+j - translates into lower 
utility for these generations than the utility of generations living forever in a fiscal regime 
without transfers (despite the fact that the consumption path starting in v+j is rising forever). 
Having thus shown that the utility of generations currently alive increases, while the utility of 
generations born in the new steady state decreases with respect to the situation of no fiscal 
transfers, suggests that there is some generation born at t>v which is indifferent to the 
introduction of the transfer policy regime. All generations before this “break-even” generation 
would profit while following generations would suffer a loss in utility. The tax adjustment 
parameter β determines how soon the “break-even” generation will see the light of day – the 
faster the tax adjustment (the higher β), the fewer yet unborn generations will profit from the 
introduction of a fiscal transfer regime.  
 
As the rate of increase of consumption depends on r-θ, it follows that generations currently 
alive would prefer that the government commits itself to a permanent transfer policy with z as 
large as possible. The vast majority of future generations instead would instead prefer no 
previously installed transfer system in order to minimise the inherited tax burden associated 
with the public debt. Note that in a complete model with capital, the lower interest rate 
associated with lower debt would be translated into higher steady state per capita 
consumption, a higher per capita capital stock and higher wages, which reinforces this line of 
reasoning.  
 
Keeping track of continuous generations’ welfare in the Blanchard/Yaari model is a 
cumbersome exercise. To simplify matters we assume a government preference function, 
which captures this trade-off between current and future generations in an ad hoc way. The 
trade-off between current and future generations is perennial both in economics and in 
politics. In our set up it is natural to think of the authorities’ attempt to transfer resources to 
the generations currently alive as represented by z while the longer run costs are represented 
by the steady state level of interest rates, r. The size of z (prosperity effect) and the size of r 
(posterity effect) approximate the trade-off a policy maker faces between current and future 
generations’ welfare.  We simply assume government preferences can be described by 
equation (13), where α is the weight given to those generations profiting from a transfer 
policy z, and (1-α) the weight to those future generations for whom lower steady state interest 
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(13)    
2 ) 1 ( r z U α α − − =
    
The particular shape of (13) is arbitrary. But any function which is well-behaved in the 
arguments z and r would do for our purposes.
15  
 
One might argue that in the real world the weight α will be very large, as governments are 
inclined to give much more weight to current generations, which are the current voters. This 
would give rise to what has been labelled the deficit bias of democracies in the political 
economy literature. Without loss of generality we will assume that in the closed economy 
(autarky) case, national institutions have been devised in such a way as to perfectly deal with 
the deficit bias problem so that each generation is treated alike. This assumption makes the 
results presented below concerning the negative incentive for fiscal laxity in a Monetary 
Union stronger. We will show that the event of Monetary Union would not only worsen any 
existing deficit bias, but that it would deteriorate the overall fiscal outcome even if national 
institutions had been devised optimally to deal with the national deficit biases before 
Monetary Union.  
 
Maximising (13) with respect to r after substituting z by using (9) and (12) one derives the 
optimal steady state interest rate in a closed economy (“autarky”). Equation (14) depicts the 















For the sake of simplicity we assume that the socially optimal transfer policy is z=0, so that 
each generation is treated alike. The corresponding “optimal” weight α*
 autarky  resulting in 
















                                                           
15 E.g. one can show that if the z (prosperity) term on the right hand side of (13) is replaced by the net 
wealth of government bonds of current generations in steady state zn/[r(β+n-r)], the preference 
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generations simply consume their endowments. We will assume in the following that national 
institutions manage to provide incentives so that for the government α=α* 
autarky.
16   
 
In terms of Figure 7, we will consider equilibrium in point A as our starting value for 
comparison with the case of integrated bond markets in Monetary Union. 
 
 
4. The Blanchard-Yaari model: the common pool problem in Monetary Union 
 
Switching from a closed economy to a Monetary Union with integrated bond markets requires 
to discuss three aspects of our model from a different perspective.  
 
First, it is important to note that the same intergenerational trade-off would be present in a 
small open economy, which takes the world interest rate as given. The government would 
face the same trade-off between transfers to current generations and the welfare of future 
generations. The difference is that in a small open economy transfers reduce the wealth of 
future generations by the accumulation of net foreign liabilities.
17   
 
Second, national consumption is not anymore restricted to the national endowment, as 
running current account deficits allows to boost national consumption. We do not characterise 
current account deficits explicitly for two reasons. We consider perfectly symmetric countries 
so that in equilibrium all countries in a Monetary Union behave the same. Thus no current 
account deficits among participating countries arise in equilibrium.
18 Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, it does not really matter whether the trade-off is cast in terms of rising 
interest rates or net foreign liabilities, one can proxy for the other. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of running current account deficits, drawing on other union member countries’ 
current endowments provides an additional incentive for expansionary national fiscal policy 
in a Monetary Union. The reason is that each government realises that if it does not increase 
transfers but other governments do, domestic agents forego current consumption to finance 
the partner countries’ fiscal transfers.    
 
                                                           
16 α* 
autarky is always smaller than 1 as β  > θ - n due to β  > r - n and r ≥ θ. 
17 See Blanchard (1985). 
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19 in the Monetary Union we need to explicitly 
assume that governments are nationalistic, in the sense that they only care about the welfare 
of their own domestic consumers. As in a Prisoner’s Dilemma type situation this implies that 
interest rate spillovers from national fiscal policies are not internalised across the Monetary 
Union. 
 
In the following we will derive the Nash equilibrium in the static game, when all countries are 
perfectly symmetric. Upon entering Monetary Union, the government has to set its transfer 
policy by choosing z, once and for all. Any change of z from its autarky level will lead to 
adjustment processes of taxes, debt and interest rates accompanied by redistribution of wealth 
across generations. Here we will not focus on the transition path, but compare the steady state 
situation before and after Monetary Union. We show in a very simple way how, starting with 
“optimal” national institutions before Monetary Union (MU), fully integrated bond markets 
will then lead to a deficit bias. This result carries over to the case of pre-existing national 
deficit biases, which would worsen when a common pool of savings becomes available to 
governments. 
 
We present the government preference function U(z, r) and the common pool problem 
graphically in r/z space, which is why we first derive the slope dr/dz of U(z, r) by means of 
the implicit function theorem. 
 
(16)   
r dz
dr





The slope depicted in (16) is definitely positive for a positive r. In r/z space, the set of 











z r  
 
The set of preference functions can then be depicted in r/z space as in Figure 9. A higher 
utility is obtained, the closer is the depicted indifference curve to the lower right corner, thus 
U(1)<U(2)<U(3)<U(4). The concave shape of the indifference curves is due to the fact that 
at higher levels of z and thus of r, further increases of the interest rate are seen as increasingly 
costly in terms of disadvantaging future generations (posterity effect).  
                                                           
19 On common pool problems with respect to fiscal policy see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 
 
                                                                                          
7+13) and Von Hagen and Harden (1996). 
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The solution of the model (9)-(11) for the interest rate as a function of z can easily be derived. 
As from now on we are interested in comparing this outcome with the outcome in a Monetary 
Union, we will introduce country superscripts where appropriate. Equation (18) reveals the 
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December 2004Obviously dr/dz>0 and it is straightforward to show that d
2r/dz
2>0 as well. Thus equation 
(18) has the convex shape depicted in Figure 9 (hyphenated line). The equilibrium, 
maximising government preferences, in a single closed economy with α at α* 
autarky is 
depicted by point A. In equilibrium the government of country i has chosen z
i  autarky =0.  
 




m). Bond markets will become integrated as bonds of each country can 
now be sold to other countries citizens, which was not possible or desirable before Monetary 
Union. The rationale is that eliminating the exchange rate risk and disregarding default risk 
makes government bonds of the m participating countries perfect substitutes. There is only 
one common interest rate level in the union.   
In the Monetary Union equations (9)-(11) now have to be rewritten as follows. 
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Furthermore the steady state value for all Monetary Union countries debt is given in (23). 




















As all m countries are perfectly symmetric and all governments will eventually chose the 
same z in equilibrium, we know that (24) holds.  















Inserting (24) in the model (20)-(22) and solving for the common interest rate, r, results in the 
very same equilibrium locus as give in equation (18) and depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Also the indifference curves in Figure 9 apply for each country with or without Monetary 
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integrated bond market without any provisions to simultaneously enhance fiscal discipline. 
  
However, the function rt(z) depicted in Figure 9 changes in Monetary Union, once one 
assumes that governments take the fiscal policies of the other countries as given. Solving the 
model (20)-(22) gives the following result for r: 
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where the slope in r/z space is given by (26). 
 












































Again we see that the slope is positive, but comparing (26) with (19) one realises that the 
slope of rt(z) in Monetary Union is smaller in equilibrium for all z



























The flatter schedule is represented by the dotted curves in Figure 9, for different assumptions 
with regard to the other countries transfer policies (∑ z
j for all j≠i). The lowest one, passing 
through point A, is drawn for the case the government of country i expects all other countries 
to leave their transfers unchanged at their autarky levels. Under this assumption country i’s 
government could hope to reach point B by increasing their transfers significantly, which 
would result in higher utility as U(4) > U(3).The reason why the government could benefit 
from being more expansionary is that the country could possibly draw on savings of the 
whole union to finance its transfers. This would dampen the increase in interest rates and 
allow for higher domestic consumption. In our simple model, the government would expect 
foreign consumers to give up part of their present consumption to buy part of country i’s debt. 
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December 2004Eventually, B will not be an equilibrium as each government will face the same incentives 
and countries are perfectly symmetric. The interest rate is determined as a function of z under 
symmetric behaviour on the rt(z) schedule as given in equation (18). In terms of Figure 9, 
point C would be the equilibrium if all governments would expand as much as country i did 
under the unrealistic assumption that the others would not change their transfer policy in the 
Monetary Union. But C is not the equilibrium either, as each single government could 
improve its situation by unilaterally reducing transfers, taking the other’s expansionary 
policies as given (moving down the dotted line passing through C) and because in C each 
government’s assumption about the other governments’ actions would turn out to be wrong. 
The Nash equilibrium is depicted in point D, at which no government can improve its 
position, given the other countries’ fiscal policies in equilibrium. Only in D expectations 
concerning other countries’ fiscal policies are validated. 
 
To show that point D is associated with a larger z
i and thus higher r than in point A it is 
sufficient to have concave indifference curves (see (17) and a flatter rt(z) schedule in EMU 
than in the Pre-MU period at the equilibrium (or symmetry-) locus (compare (19) and (26)).  
 
Thus we have for rt(z) on the equilibrium schedule (18): 
 









t ≠ ∀ = > ∀ =    where 
i z stands for a constant z 
equal to z
i, corresponding to the respective locus on the equilibrium schedule (18). 
 
More formally the new equilibrium D can be characterised by the slope equality of (26) and 
(16) evaluated at the equilibrium schedule (18).  
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Using (18) to replace the square root in (28) one obtains the optimal steady state interest rate 
in Monetary Union given by (29). 
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December 2004Note that if m equals 1 (the no Monetary Union case), the optimal interest rate is obviously 
the same as shown in (14). Equation (30) reveals that dr/dm is positive. A higher interest rate 
is, of course, associated with a policy providing higher transfers z according to equations (18) 
or (25).  
 
(30)     
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Thus the larger the Monetary Union, the more important will be the need for institutions to 
safeguard fiscal discipline. If m approaches infinity, which means that governments will not 
expect any interest rate effect whatever their transfer policy, (29) shows that r
opt, MU tends to 
(β+θ+n)/2, which in Figure 7 is associated with the largest possible transfer policy at z
max as 
depicted by point C. One can obtain the required change in the institutional setting also by 
calibrating again the optimal weight α*
MU, which would allow maximisation of the 
government preference function to lead to r=θ.   
 











n C m n
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Comparing (15) with (31) shows that α*
Pre-MU > α*
MU for m >1. Thus to maintain the same 
level of intergenerational equity in a Monetary Union, institutions have to be adjusted so that 
governments have less incentives to favour current generations.  
 
We have shown that the common pool problem creates – or exacerbates – an 
intergenerational, political economy deficit bias in a Monetary Union. In our simple model 
the bias becomes visible through the difference r
MU - θ > 0 triggered by the increased transfer 
to current generations as z
MU  > 0 when no deficit bias was present initially. But more 
generally, any pre-existing national bias would get worse as a result of the common pool 
problem as becomes clear from equations (29) and (30). We have thus exposed a rationale for 
an enhanced need for fiscal discipline in a Monetary Union. 
 
Our argument could possibly be strengthened further in an extended model with capital 
accumulation. Then, as a result of initially higher aggregate per capita consumption   
following the fiscal expansion, steady state capital would be significantly lower when 
governments draw on a common pool of savings, creating an additional channel for 
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steady state real growth would be lower in Monetary Union.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
There are many different views in the literature on the role of fiscal policies in a monetary 
union. Those who emphasize the need for discipline rely mainly on three sets of different 
arguments. The first view is based on the link between the sustainability of fiscal positions 
and the credibility of the commitment of monetary policy to maintain price stability. The idea 
is that unsustainable debt accumulation in a Member State could put pressure on the central 
bank to erode the real value of debt through inflation. The second view stresses possible 
systemic implications from the default of a sovereign borrower. Given a threat of contagion 
and systemic risk, other governments would be tempted to bail out a heavily indebted 
country. Sometimes the first mechanism is labeled “ex ante” bail out and, analogously the 
second is labeled “ex post” bail out. The third type of argument relies on a “deficit bias” in 
national public finances, which is exacerbated by spillovers operating in a Monetary Union 
driving up real interest rates as a result. 
 
The argument in our paper belongs to the latter category where the spillover derives from the 
temptation, for national governments, to exploit the enlarged common pool of savings in 
Monetary Union at the expense of future generations. Most existing theoretical analysis has 
focused on the need for fiscal constraints in order to underpin the sustainability of long-term 
public finances. In our model sustainability is not an issue, but instead the question of the 
intergenerational distribution of resources provides a rationale for fiscal discipline. The case 
for discipline is enhanced in Monetary Union due to spillovers from national fiscal policies on 
the common interest rate in an integrated bond market. In other words, the marginal effect of 
any individual country’s increase in public debt on debt financing costs falls, when a country 
can draw on a larger common pool of savings in Monetary Union. In equilibrium this 
spillover encourages free-riding behavior by all governments leading to higher interest rates 
and intergenerational redistribution at the expense of posterity. 
 
We recognize that some features of our model – e.g. the assumption of perfect bond market 
integration and the use of a real model with no role for money or monetary policy – obviously 
leave out some important issues. At the same time, in our view this simple story has two main 
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two types of bail out, which would imply a lack of credibility of existing Treaty provisions 
(i.e. the primary objective of price stability, no monetary financing and the so-called no bail 
out clause). Second, our case for fiscal discipline need not rely on unsustainable 
developments in public finances and thus on extreme and relatively unlikely events, which are 
hard to reconcile with models assuming forward-looking agents and rational expectations. 
Instead in our model, the relevant spillover effects in perfectly integrated bond markets 
operate at all times. The intertemporal budget policy considered is sustainable and therefore 
compatible with equilibrium under perfect foresight on the part of the private sector. 
 
We have motivated the relevance of our model for Monetary Union (but not the global level) 
by pointing to the evidence that monetary unification has been empirically associated with 
sovereign debt market integration. The degree of integration inside the Union is an order of 
magnitude deeper than in the global economy. This suggests that the need for fiscal discipline 
to safeguard intergenerational equity inside Monetary Union is much stronger than at the 
global level. Obviously, any effort to increase fiscal discipline based on this argument would 
at the same time also promote prospects for the sustainability of public finances. It would also 
help counteract any tendency to run-up higher debt as a consequence of the fall of borrowing 
costs associated with interest rate convergence to lower levels in the transition to Monetary 
Union and access to a larger, deeper pool of capital. 
 
We conclude with a few remarks on possible extensions of our model and avenues for further 
research. First, it would be possible, though cumbersome, to explicitly introduce capital into 
the model. In this case, as already emphasized, any increase in the equilibrium interest rate 
would lead to a lower per capita capital stock and possibly growth and lower welfare in 
steady state. Second, our model compares the autarky (closed economy) case and Monetary 
Union while possible additional affects from the global economy are not taken into account. 
This seems justified as a first approximation on the basis of the different scale of bond market 
integration observed, but could be explored further both theoretically and empirically. Third, 
we assume symmetric, identical countries. Instead, one could explore differences in 
government (intergenerational) preferences or country size. All else equal, the spillover 
effects in our model would suggest that large countries (with proportionally larger effects on 
the common interest rate) would be relatively more disciplined compared to smaller Member 
States. Furthermore, in the presence of rules to safeguard fiscal discipline, the model suggests 
that smaller countries would be particularly interested in the larger countries’ compliance 




Working Paper Series No. 420
December 2004considerations such as the degree of ex-post bargaining power with respect to the enforcement 
of rules, which could also be related to country size. 
 
This brings us to our final concluding remark: our model forcefully restates the case for fiscal 
discipline in Monetary Union, based on intergenerational equity considerations. However, it 
is silent on how fiscal discipline might be best achieved. This is a question of mechanism 
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In the following we show that the lifetime utility of generations living in the old steady state 
without transfers is higher than the lifetime utility of generations born in the new steady state 
with the bond financed transfer system in place.  
The lifetime utility of generations living in a regime with no fiscal transfers and thus no debt 
and taxes is given in (A1) 
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The lifetime utility of generations born in the new steady state with z>0 is depicted in (A2). 
Note that starting from the consumption at birth, consumption permanently increases at the 
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 Using integration by parts for the second integral in (A3) leads to 
 


































Note that for the case where z=0 and thus r=θ  (A4) equals (A1). The third term in square 









1 ln , which for small values of (r-θ)/θ  can be 
approximated by (r-θ)/θ. The second and third term in square brackets thus cancel. (A4) is 
can then simply be written as (A5). 
 


















Comparing (A5), i.e. the lifetime utility of a generation born in the steady state of a fiscal 
regime with z>0, with (A1), i.e. the lifetime utility of a generation living in a regime where 
z=0, reveals that (A5) is smaller than (A1) as long as we are in a dynamically efficient 
economy where r>n. Obviously, if the interest rate r would be smaller than the population 
growth rate n, government debt would not constitute a burden for future generations, and 
transfers would be beneficial for all generations. But dynamic inefficiency is excluded due to 
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